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Abstract
Although social behaviour can bring many benefits to an individual, there are also costs that may be incurred whenever the
members of a social group interact. The formation of dominance hierarchies could offer a means of reducing some of the
costs of social interaction, but individuals within the hierarchy may end up paying differing costs dependent upon their
position within the hierarchy. These differing interaction costs may therefore influence the behaviour of the group, as
subordinate individuals may experience very different benefits and costs to dominants when the group is conducting a
given behaviour. Here, a state-dependent dynamic game is described which considers a pair of social foragers where there
is a set dominance relationship within the pair. The model considers the case where the subordinate member of the pair
pays an interference cost when it and the dominant individual conduct specific pairs of behaviours together. The model
demonstrates that if the subordinate individual pays these energetic costs when it interacts with the dominant individual,
this has effects upon the behaviour of both subordinate and the dominant individuals. Including interaction costs increases
the amount of foraging behaviour both individuals conduct, with the behaviour of the pair being driven by the subordinate
individual. The subordinate will tend to be the lighter individual for longer periods of time when interaction costs are
imposed. This supports earlier suggestions that lighter individuals should act as the decision-maker within the pair, giving
leadership-like behaviours that are based upon energetic state. Pre-existing properties of individuals such as their
dominance will be less important for determining which individual makes the decisions for the pair. This suggests that, even
with strict behavioural hierarchies, identifying which individual is the dominant one is not sufficient for identifying which
one is the leader.
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Introduction
Animals can gain many benefits from associating in groups [1],
but there are disadvantages that need to be considered as well.
Competition for resources that cannot easily be shared equally
(such as food, security, or access to mates) can lead to conflict
between the members of the group [2]. Many species have social
mechanisms for quickly or automatically resolving these conflict
situations, such as the quick and definitive formation and
maintenance of dominance relationships [3,4]. Because group-
living often means that individuals within a hierarchy are
constantly interacting, these relationships can have long-term
consequences upon the behaviours shown by individuals of
different social standing, and therefore the effects of dominance
need to be considered when we are interested in understanding
the individual and collective behaviours of the group’s members.
Ignoring the effects of these interactions could lead to us
misunderstanding behavioural dynamics at the levels of the
individual and of the group [5,6].
Differing effects of dominance upon the behaviour of interacting
individuals have been integrated into a number of theoretical
studies. Some have concentrated upon how dominance affects the
order of access to resources, where dominants may have priority or
exclusive access to a foraging resource [7,8]. Alternatively,
dominant individuals may benefit during social foraging by
reducing the degree of predation risk they experience during
foraging by forcing subordinates into riskier positions [9–11] or
more dangerous foraging periods during the day [12]. Other
models have considered these imbalances in access to resources
[13], as well as cases where dominance interactions lead to the
spatial displacement of lower ranked individuals away from a
patch [14,15].
As well as effects upon foraging ability and group composition,
living in social hierarchies can impose differing costs on
individuals [16–20]. Rands et al. [6] considered an individual-
based model consisting of a population made up of dominant and
subordinate individuals, where all the individuals followed simple
foraging rules when foraging, and where all individuals
experienced the same energetic costs and gains during foraging,
regardless of whether they were dominant or subordinate.
However, subordinate individuals also experienced an additional
cost when they foraged in close proximity to dominant
individuals. This single additional cost had effects upon the
movement behaviour and energetic stores of the subordinate
individuals within the population. This single cost was considered
to give a simple representation of a ‘socially mediated
interference’ cost [21,22], and considered the situation where a
subordinate suffered if it foraged at the same time as a dominant
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individual (which could then be compared to a similar model
where dominance costs weren’t considered [23]).
The way in which this socially mediated interference cost
was implemented within the spatially-explicit individual-based
framework of [6] involved making some broad assumptions about
the rules that individuals use. As Rands [24,25] discusses, making
assumptions about rules within these models is useful, but we can
greatly enhance the value of these rules if we are able to derive
them from an even simpler set of assumptions. Therefore, in this
paper I describe a state-dependent dynamic game model that
explicitly considers the effects of several different socially-mediated
costs upon the behaviour of a pair of socially foraging animals. I
aim to show that imposing socially-mediated costs has effects upon
the optimal behaviours of both the individual that is paying the
costs (the subordinate), and in addition, upon the individual who is
not directly paying these costs (the dominant). The dominant is
instead being affected indirectly by these costs due to their effects
upon the behaviour of the subordinate. In addition, I will also
consider whether imposing costs of dominance mean that a
dominant individual is the individual driving the behaviour of the
pair.
Methods
Overview of model assumptions
The model followed here builds on the dynamic foraging game
described by Rands et al. [26,27]. In the simpler model described
in [26], the decisions made by a pair of individuals are considered.
The model uses dynamic programming techniques [28–32] to
identify the optimal behaviours of a pair of animals, who are both
characterised by possessing energy reserves (which defines their
‘state’) which change stochastically as a result of the actions that
both individuals take over a series of consecutive decisions. Both
members of the pair are able to accurately assess each other’s
energetic reserves as well as their own, and their actions are
informed by this information. During a period, each individual
can choose to conduct one of two actions: either to rest or to forage
for the entire period. Both actions incur an energetic cost which
depletes the reserves of the individual, but foraging can also lead to
the forager finding food (within a stochastic environment),
meaning that, on average, it should see a net gain in its energetic
reserves if it forages. Energetic reserves are important within the
model: it is assumed that if they fall too low, an individual starves
to death. It is also assumed that there is an upper limit to the
capacity of the reserves, beyond which they cannot be increased
further.
As well as the risk of starvation if an individual doesn’t forage,
there is also the risk of predation, which depends on the actions of
both individuals in the pair. If an individual choses to rest during a
period, it incurs a low risk of being predated. If it forages at the
same time as its colleague, it incurs a moderate risk of being
predated (which could be through increased protection against
predation from being in a small group, or enhanced detection, or
simply a dilution of risk). If it forages on its own (whilst its
colleague rests), it incurs the greatest risk of being predated.
Therefore, there is a trade-off within this framework between
being predated when foraging, and starving whilst resting. Rands
et al. [26] demonstrate that these assumptions can be modelled
using a stochastic dynamic game, and show that optimal policies
can be calculated, which describe the optimal actions of an
individual within a pair: the policies allow an individual to
identify the suitable action to conduct given that it knows its own
energetic reserves and those of its colleague at a given moment in
time. Rands et al. [27] extend these models by considering what
occurs when individuals are not identical in the costs they incur
for conducting actions, or the amount of energy they gain during
a period, or in the risks they face when conducting specific
actions.
The model I describe here builds further on this framework.
Although Rands et al. [27] considered possible differences between
individuals in various parameters, they did not consider what
could happen in a dominance interaction, where specific
behavioural interactions between the two members of a pair
incurred additional costs to one of the members (which I refer to as
the ‘subordinate’), similar to the socially-mediated interference
costs proposed in [6]. Note that I assume both that the dominance
hierarchy has been decided by the pair members prior to the start
of the period modelled, and that this hierarchy is adhered to
throughout, with no further requirements to maintain it (see [33]
for work considering the formation and maintenance of hierar-
chies). Here, I consider there to be four possible situations where
an additional cost can be incurred by the subordinate:
i) when both it and the individual who does not pay a cost
(which I refer to as the ‘dominant’) are foraging together
(which could for example be a proximity or vigilance cost,
or simply a reduction in foraging efficiency due to direct
competition from the dominant);
ii) when both the dominant and the subordinate are resting
(which again could be a proximity cost, or perhaps an
energetic cost due to the subordinate expending energy
providing a service such as grooming to the dominant);
iii) when the subordinate is foraging on its own (which could be
through social anxiety at not knowing where the dominant
individual is, or through an increased cost of scanning for
food, predators, or the dominant);
iv) when the subordinate is resting on its own (which again
could be through social anxiety at not knowing where the
dominant individual is).
In (iii) and (iv), I assume the dominant individual is conducting
the opposite behaviour to the subordinate.
Model details
The model considers a dynamic game between pair of players
consisting of a dominant and a subordinate individual. This
dynamic game builds on solution procedures outlined in [28] and
[34], following a state-dependent framework as described in
Author Summary
Dominance hierarchies could offer interacting animals a
quick way to settle disputes without having to use too
much effort. However, individuals may pay a price for
acknowledging their position within the hierarchy, which
could influence how they choose to behave within the
group. Consequently, the actions of the group may be
shaped by the effects of the hierarchy on each of the
group’s members. I consider the behaviour of a pair that
consists of a dominant and a subordinate individual, where
the subordinate pays an energetic cost when it interacts
with the dominant. I show that having to pay this cost
affects the behaviour of the pair. I also demonstrate that,
although a social hierarchy is imposed, the behaviour of
the pair is not determined by the dominance relationship,
but is instead influenced by the energetic reserves of the
pair, where the decision-maker may just be whoever is the
hungriest.
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[28–31]. General computation methods build on the dynamic
game framework for pairs of foragers, outlined in [26] and
described in detail in [27], and the reader is referred to the latter
for full details of the assumptions and the computational solution
process, which are not repeated here. Unless described here,
details are identical to those given in [27], and consequently I do
not repeat any analysis for the effects of variables other than the
socially-mediated costs that are introduced in this paper. To
summarise the procedure described in [27] in a brief, using the
assumptions about the effects of pair members’ actions as detailed
in the overview above, an initial candidate strategy is assumed.
This defines all possible actions that each individual should take,
given that it knows its own energetic reserves and those of its
colleague at a moment in time. Assuming one of the pair members
is using the current candidate strategy, a best response can be
calculated for its colleague using dynamic programming. To do
this, I make an additional initial assumption about how energetic
state relates to fitness (where fitness is used as a common currency
to compare all possible actions [35]), but this initial assumption
about how fitness relates to state is rendered unimportant through
strong backwards convergence [28]. Once an optimal response
strategy to the current population strategy has been identified, the
best response to that strategy could be calculated, and then the
best response to that, and so forth, with the aim of identifying an
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). However, it is difficult to
iterate to an ESS using this direct route (e.g. [36,37]), and I instead
used a error-making approach [34], where the candidate strategy
is updated at each iterative step by combining the previous
candidate strategy with the newly identified best response strategy
(weighting the new candidate strategy strongly towards the
previous candidate strategy). Using this technique, an ESS is
identified through an iterative computational process. For finer
detail of the assumptions, please see [26] and [27].
Where the current model differs from that presented in [27] is in
the detail of the function denoted Hi(xi, xj, t; ui, uj, p), which defines
the probability that an individual of type i who is alive at the start
of time step t, in state xi (.0), paired with a living colleague of
corresponding type j in state xj (.0) who follows a strategy defined
by the candidate strategy p, will survive until the start of the final
time step T, if it adopts action ui and its colleague adopts action uj
in the current time step (assuming that the focal individual i
thereafter behaves so as to maximise its chances of surviving until
time step T, taking into account errors in decision making). Note
that, as with the model described in [27], the candidate strategy p
encompasses the candidate responses of both subordinate and
dominant individuals within the population (which means that it
defines the current ‘best’ action that an individual should take
given that it knows its own energy reserves, and those of its
colleague: the modelling process considers all possible state
combinations of energy reserves for both dominant and subordi-
nate individual, and the candidate strategy therefore includes
current ‘best’ actions for all of these).
In order to consider the effects of dominance on behaviour, I
replace the Hi(xi, xj, t; ui, uj, p) function described in [27] with the
following set of definitions, which are dependent upon whether the
focal individual is dominant or subordinate, and assume that both
individuals in a pair are alive at the moment the decision is made
(note that the associated functions that describe what occurs when
only the focal individual is alive at the decision point, or that
describe what happens if no individuals are alive at the decision
point, are identical to those presented in [27], and are therefore
not described here). Throughout, terms relevant to subordinates
are denoted with a subscript s, and terms relevant to dominants
are denoted with a subscript d.
If the individual is dominant, I assume
Hd xd,xs,t;R,R,pð Þ
~ 1{mdRð Þ
X
cd
kd cd ;Rð Þ msRWd Ld xd{cdð Þ,0,tz1; pð Þ½
z1{msRð Þ
X
cs
ks cs;Rð ÞWd Ld xd{cdð Þ,Ls xs{cs{DdRsRð Þ,tz1;pð Þ
Hd xd,xs,t;R,F,pð Þ
~1{mdAð Þ
X
cd
X
gd
kd cd;Fð Þcd gdð ÞmsRWd Ld xd{cdzgdð Þ,0,tz1;pð Þ½
z1{msRð Þ
X
cs
ks cs;Rð ÞWd Ld xd{cdzgdð Þ,Ls xs{cs{DdFsRð Þ,tz1;pð Þ
Hd xd ,xs,t;R,F ,pð Þ
~ 1{mdRð Þ
X
cd
kd cd ;Rð Þ msAWd Ld xd{cdð Þ,0,tz1; pð Þ½
z 1{msAð Þ
X
cs
X
gs
ks cs;Fð Þcs gsð ÞWd Ld xd{cdð Þ,ð
Ls xs{cszgs{DdRsFð Þ,tz1; pÞ
Hd xd ,xs,t;F ,F ,pð Þ
~1{mdTð Þ
X
cd
X
gd
kd cd;Fð Þcd gdð ÞmsTWd Ld xd{cdzgdð Þ,0,tz1; pð Þ½
z 1{msTð Þ
X
cs
X
gs
ks cs;Fð Þcs gsð ÞWd Ld xd{cdzgdð Þð ,
Ls xs{cszgs{DdFsFð Þ,tz1; pÞ
If the focal individual is subordinate, I instead assume
Hs xs,xd ,t;R,R,pð Þ
~ 1{msRð Þ
X
cs
ks cs;Rð Þ mdRWs Ls xs{cs{DdRsRð Þ,0,tz1; pð Þ½
z 1{mdRð Þ
X
cd
kd cd ;Rð ÞWs Lsð xs{cs{DdRsRð Þ,
Ld xd{cdð Þ,tz1; pÞ
Hs xs,xd ,t;F ,R,pð Þ
~1{msAð Þ
X
cs
X
gs
ks cs;Fð Þcs gsð ÞmdRWsLs xs{cszgs{DdRsFð Þ,0,tz1;pð Þ½
z1{mdRð Þ
X
cd
kd cd;Rð ÞWs Ls xs{cszgs{DdRsFð Þ,Ld xd{cdð Þ,tz1;pð Þ
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Hs xs,xd ,t;R,F ,pð Þ
~ 1{msRð Þ
X
cs
ks cs;Rð Þ mdAWs Ls xs{cs{DdFsRð Þ,0,tz1; pð Þ½
z 1{mdAð Þ
X
cd
X
gd
kd cd;Fð Þcd gdð ÞWs Ls xs{cs{DdFsRð Þ,ð
Ld xd{cdzgdð Þ,tz1; pÞ
Hs xs,xd ,t;F ,F ,pð Þ
~1{msTð Þ
X
cs
X
gs
kscs;Fð Þcs gsð ÞmdTWs Ls xs{cszgs{DdFsFð Þ,0,tz1;pð Þ½
z1{mdTð Þ
X
cd
X
gd
kd cd;Fð Þcd gdð ÞWs Ls xs{cszgs{DdFsFð Þ,ð
Ld xd{cdzgdð Þ,tz1; pÞ
Apart from the novel interference cost terms (described below),
terminology here follows [27], and is only briefly summarised here.
An individual of type a has a probability maR of being predated if it
is resting, maA if it is foraging alone, and maT if it is foraging with its
colleague. The function Wa(xa,xb,t;p) is the fitness at time t of an
individual of type a with energy reserves xa, and whose colleague
has energy reserves xb, assuming that both individuals follow policy
p from that point forward in time. La(x) defines a ‘chop’ function
for an individual of type a as defined in [30], where La(x) =
min(Sa,max(x,0)), and Sa is the maximum state value possible for an
individual of type a. ka(ca;u) denotes the probability that an
individual of type a spends ca state units of energy during a period
if it conducts action u, and ca(ga) denotes the probability that it
gains ga state units of energy during the period if it forages. Both
energetic costs and gains were represented within the current
model using the same functions described in [27], where the
probabilities defined followed a discretised distribution based on
normal distributions with defined means and standard deviations.
For simplicity, both dominant and subordinate individual were
assumed to have identical probabilities of incurring given gains
and costs, and share identical predation risks when conducting
particular activities (so mdT = msT, etc.). The only difference
considered between them was in the extra cost paid by the
subordinate individual when it was conducting a paired behaviour
that incurred extra energetic costs. These energetic costs are
denoted DdRsR, DdFsR, DdRsF and DdFsF, which represent the extra
energetic cost (in state units) incurred for the four possible pairs of
behaviours (where the general form DdUsV represents the cost paid
by the subordinate when the dominant conducted action U and
the subordinate conducted action V). The dominant is not
expected to pay any extra costs for its actions dependent upon
the behaviour of the subordinate.
Summary statistics
Once stable behavioural policies for subordinate and dominant
individuals had been identified, forward iterations using Markov
chain processes [29] were then used to calculate the distribution of
a pair’s states within a stable population. Again, full details of the
process and assumptions made follow those described in [27].
Having identified a stable distribution of paired states, I then
calculated the following summary statistics:
Individual behaviours. Having identified both the optimal
policies for dominant and subordinate members of a pair, as well
as the stable distribution of paired energetic reserves within the
population, I was therefore able to calculate the proportion of the
dominant and the subordinate population that would be foraging
during a period.
Paired behaviours. Similarly, knowing stable paired states
and policies also allowed us to calculate the proportions of the
population where both members of a pair foraged during a period
(pFF), where both members of a pair rested during a period (pRR),
where the dominant foraged and the subordinate rested (pFR), or
where the dominant rested and the subordinate foraged (pRF).
Synchrony coefficient. Having calculated the proportions of
the population conducting the four types of paired behaviour, I
quantified the amount of behavioural synchronisation during a
period as (pRR ? pFF - pRF ? pFR)/(pRR ? pFF + pRF ? pFR). Note this
term is referred to in [26] and [27] as D9, but I avoid using this
notation here to avoid confusion with the cost of dominance used
in the current model.
Independence of action. Rands & Johnstone [38] describe
two similar methods for quantifying the degree of dependence that
paired individuals have upon knowing the state of a colleague in
order to be able to conduct the optimal behaviour: this
demonstrates whether synchronisation of behaviour (or lack of it)
can only come about through pair members having to track each
others’ state, or whether any observed synchronisation is merely a
by-product of tracking both individuals’ behaviour in isolation to
their colleagues. Here, I use the S statistic described in [38], which
provides a more naturalistic information-driven statistic than the C
statistic described in the same paper.
Repeatability of behaviours. Given that a dominant or a
subordinate can choose to conduct one behaviour during a period,
the stable population and policies calculated above could be used
to calculate the proportion of the population where the individual
then conducts the same behaviour in the following period.
Tracking repetition over time, I also calculated the repeatability
of paired behaviours: this was taken to be the mean number of
periods until at least 50% of the population had conducted at least
one different pair of behaviours to that which they were engaged
in at the initial period recorded.
Energetic reserves. he mean energetic reserves of the
dominant and the subordinate individuals were calculated from
the stable population distributions calculated above.
Repeatability of difference in energetic reserves. Due to
the stochastic nature of the system, it was possible that both the
dominant and the subordinate individual could end up having the
highest energetic reserves. I calculated the mean length of time
that dominants or subordinates maintained the roˆle of ‘heaviest
individual’ within the pair.
Parameter exploration
I explored the effects of the costs by randomly generating 1,000
sets of other model parameters, and then calculating optimal
policies and population distributions for all possible combinations
of the four socially-mediated interference costs. Table 1 describes
the parameters used within this model, including the use of
randomisation to generate differences between parameter sets. For
each set of parameters, I considered the sixteen possible scenarios
where DdRsR, DdFsR, DdRsF and DdFsF could each take a value of
either 0 or 1 state units, representing a full spectrum of cases where
there was a potential cost to be paid by a subordinate individual
dependent upon the actions of the dominant member of the pair.
After calculating policies and stable population distributions,
summary statistics were calculated for each of these sixteen
Social Foraging and Dominance Relationships
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possible scenarios, and exploratory analyses were conducted as
detailed below.
Analyses of summary statistics
The model considers four possible interference costs to a
subordinate individual, all of which could potentially have a
separate effect upon its energetic turnover during a period
dependent upon the behaviour of the pair. Therefore, I was
interested in the interactions of the costs, as well as each of the costs
themselves. To explore this, standard analysis of variance was used
to generate F values for the four costs and the eleven possible
interactions involving two, three or all four of these. The distribution
of the results generated would not fit the standard assumptions
necessary for ANOVA, and so I used resampling methods to
identify critical F values, following recommendations in [39].
Because I was potentially interested in the effects of interactions, I
would have been unable to generate resampled critical F values by
the random assortment of results such that the untested costs or
interactions were kept correctly assorted. However, my sample
population of results was large, and I therefore generated resampled
critical F values by freely permuting my entire dataset without
restriction, following recommendations in [39]. For each, I used R
2.12.1 [40] to permute the entire dataset without replacement
50,000 times, harvesting the fifteen F values for an ANOVA
conducted on each permuted set, and used the quantile function
within R to identify the value of the 95% quantile values.
Results
The statistical model considered includes two-, three- and four-
way interactions, as these were biologically feasible within the
framework considered. The results of these interactions are
presented in full in Tables 2 and 3 for completeness, but only
interesting relationships are discussed within the results section, as
many of the relationships seen (especially for the three- and four-
way interactions) were complex and difficult to interpret. All F
values, along with the F values critical for demonstrating p,0.05
that were calculated by resampling, are reproduced in Supporting
Tables S1 and S2.
Individual behaviours
All individual increases in dominance cost led to an increase in
the amount of foraging behaviour shown by the subordinate
(Table 2) – there were also significant interactions between paired
costs (and most three- or four-way interactions), although in all
cases adding a cost led to an increase in foraging behaviour.
Increasing the costs experienced by the subordinate led to
increases in most of the individual foraging behaviour shown by
the dominant, except for the case where the subordinate only
experienced costs when it was resting and the dominant was
foraging, which is likely to be a situation when the dominant is not
going to be affected by the actions of the subordinate too much.
Paired behaviours
The increases in individual foraging behaviour were also echoed
in the paired behaviours (Table 2). Considering all the single costs
within the statistical model, increasing any of the costs experienced
by the subordinate individual led to an increase in its foraging
behaviour, and a decrease in its resting behaviour. The fact that
the direction of change is dictated solely by the subordinate
individual suggests that the action of the dominant individual is
being driven primarily by its foraging partner.
Paired costs led to increases in both individuals foraging
together, and (apart from the case where the subordinate always
paid a cost when the dominant was foraging), decreases in resting
Table 1. Parameters used in model, with values used for model exploration.
Variable Description Value
cmax Largest cost possible 4 state units
DdFsF Extra energetic cost paid by subordinate when both it and the dominant are foraging 0 or 1
DdFsR Extra energetic cost paid by subordinate when it is resting and the dominant is foraging 0 or 1
DdRsF Extra energetic cost paid by subordinate when it is foraging and the dominant is resting 0 or 1
DdRsR Extra energetic cost paid by subordinate when both it and the dominant are resting 0 or 1
gmax Maximum gain during a period 6 state units
k Error in decision making 0.0000001
l Population adjustment constant 0.1
mA Predation risk when foraging alone exp(-25r1)
mR Predation risk when resting mT(1-(r2)
2)
mT Predation risk when foraging together mA(1-(r3)
2)
mF Mean cost of foraging (r4 ? n) state units
mR Mean cost of resting (r5 ? mF) state units
n Mean gain from foraging (4 r6 + 1) state units
y s.d. of energetic gain when foraging (0.5)0.5 state units
S Maximum state possible 40 state units
sF s.d. of energetic gain when foraging (0.5)
0.5 state units
sR s.d. of energetic gain when resting (0.5)
0.5 state units
Where these are not discussed in the text, refer to [27] for full clarification of their purpose. Note also that, with the exception of DdFsF, DdFsF, DdFsF and DdFsF (all of which
are only experienced by the subordinate), all values are assumed equal for subordinate and dominant individuals. To generate a set of parameters for use within the
simulations, six values r1, r2, r3, r4, r5 and r6 were randomly and independently sampled from a uniform distribution with the range (0, 1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002252.t001
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Table 2. The effects of systematically changing dominance costs on the foraging behaviour of a pair.
Subordinate pays
extra cost when
proportion
of time
dominant
forages
proportion
of time
subordinate
forages
proportion
of time
both players
forage
proportion of
time dominant
forages,
subordinate
rests
proportion of
time dominant
rests,
subordinate
forages
proportion of
time both
players rest
synchrony
coefficient S
both players forage (FF) + + + – + – – –
the dominant forages, and
the subordinate rests (FR)
NS + + – + – + NS
the dominant rests, and the
subordinate forages (RF)
+ + + – + – + NS
both players rest (RR) + + + – + – – +
interaction terms
FF6 FR NS + + * NS NS – NS
FF6 RF + + + * NS – – –
FR6 RF NS + + – + – * NS
FF6 RR + + + NS + – – –
FR6 RR * + + NS NS – * *
RF6 RR * + + NS NS – + *
FF6 FR6 RF * NS NS * * NS * NS
FF6 FR6 RR NS * * * NS NS * NS
FF6 RF6 RR * * * * * * NS NS
FR6 RF6 RR * * * NS NS * * NS
FF6 FR6 RF6 RR * * NS NS NS * * NS
This table reports the significance and direction of change for these result sets, based on ANOVA models containing all four costs of dominance and all possible
interactions between these costs. Assuming a significance term of p,0.05, ‘+’ indicates that there was a significant increase in the behavioural measure when a cost was
increased, or, in the case of a two-way interaction, increasing both terms led to an increase in the behavioural measure. ‘–’ indicates a similar decrease. ‘*’ indicates that
an interaction term was significant, but did not follow a simple pattern of either both terms leading to an increase or to a decrease. ‘NS’ indicates that the measure was
not significant (p$0.05). Full statistical details are presented in Supporting Table S1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002252.t002
Table 3. The effects of systematically changing dominance costs on history and energy reserves of a pair.
Subordinate pays
extra cost when
likelihood
dominant
repeats
behaviour
likelihood
subordinate
repeats
behaviour
length of
time a paired
behaviour is
repeated
energetic
reserves of
dominant
energetic
reserves of
subordinate
length of
time
dominant
heaviest
length of
time
subordinate
heaviest
both players forage (FF) + + NS + – NS –
the dominant forages, and the
subordinate rests (FR)
NS + + + + – +
the dominant rests, and the
subordinate forages (RF)
NS + + + – + –
both players rest (RR) – – – + – NS –
interaction terms
FF6 FR NS NS NS + – * NS
FF6 RF * + * NS – * NS
FR6 RF NS + NS + + * NS
FF6 RR + + NS NS NS * –
FR6 RR NS + NS NS + – *
RF6 RR NS + NS NS – + NS
FF6 FR6 RF NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
FF6 FR6 RR * * NS * NS NS *
FF6 RF6 RR NS * NS NS NS NS NS
FR6 RF6 RR NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
FF6 FR6 RF6 RR NS * NS NS NS NS NS
See Table 2 for an explanation of the terminology used. Full statistical details are presented in Supporting Table S2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002252.t003
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together. The paired interactions when the members of the pair
were conducting differing behaviours were mostly non-significant,
although there were increases in cases where the dominant rested
and the subordinate foraged when the costs experienced by the
subordinate occurred when the pair differed in their behaviour.
Synchrony coefficient
As would be expected, pairs become more synchronised when
there are costs involved with not being paired, and become less
synchronised when there are costs to conducting the same action
as each other (Table 2). Considering this alongside the paired
behaviour results suggests that although the subordinate is driving
the behaviours of the pair, its own actions are therefore partially
dictated by the costs that it pays. Note also that this measure (with
similar reasoning for the following S statistic) does not discriminate
between resting together and foraging together. Therefore, an
increase in only one of these paired behaviours may not lead to a
corresponding increase in the general level of synchronisation
within the pair.
Independence of action
The S statistic decreased in response to a dominance cost when
foraging together, and decreased when resting together (Table 2).
Resting alone doesn’t incur any more risk of predation than when
resting together, and it is therefore feasible that as resting together
becomes more costly to the subordinate, it should therefore
become more dependent upon the state of its colleague dictating
its actions (in this case, avoiding resting together), leading to the
decrease in synchrony shown by the synchrony coefficient. The
decrease in dependence with an increasing cost of foraging
together is echoed in the observation that the subordinate
individual should be increasing its foraging regardless of the
actions of the dominant.
Repeatability of behaviours
Both the dominant and subordinate individuals tended to
increase their repetition of behaviour when there was an extra cost
to the subordinate of foraging at the same time as the dominant
(Table 3). This is likely to be an effect of foraging being highly
synchronised: the subordinate has to forage at the same time as the
dominant, and consequently needs the pair to spend more time
foraging than the dominant in order to fund the energy it spends
(especially, but counterintuitively, whilst foraging). Both individ-
uals tended to reduce their repetition of behaviour when there was
an extra cost to the subordinate of resting together. This is likely to
be due to the reduction in the amount of time that the subordinate
rests overall – an increased likelihood of foraging suggests that a
pair of individuals will be swapping between different pairs of
behaviours, and is demonstrated in a similar reduction in the mean
length of time that pairs of individuals repeated a paired behaviour
(Table 3).
The subordinate individual also tended to repeat its own
behaviour more often when there was a dominance cost associated
with conducting the opposite behaviour to the dominant
individual (note here that this means an overall increase in the
subordinate repeating a behaviour irrespective of what the
dominant is doing, rather than a statement that the subordinate
is increasing conducting the opposite behaviour to the dominant).
Most of the interactions shown for the subordinate individual also
indicate a positive trend. Paired behaviours were also repeated
more often when these costs were incurred. These increases are
likely to be due to the increase in synchronisation behaviour seen
when there is an extra cost to being non-synchronised.
Energetic reserves
As would be expected, incurring an extra cost of dominance to
the subordinate meant that its energetic reserves tended to be
reduced (Table 3). This was not the case where there was a
dominance cost to the subordinate when it rested and the
dominant foraged, which may be due to an increase in the
subordinate tending to forage in order to avoid this cost.
Regardless of which sort of cost was imposed on the subordinate,
the dominant tended to gain energetic reserves when there was a
cost, which ties in with the increase in subordinate foraging
behaviour and corresponding synchronisation by the dominant
individual.
Repeatability of difference in energetic reserves
The length of time that the subordinate remained heaviest
(when it managed to reach that state of being) was in most cases
reduced by imposing a cost of dominance (Table 3). The exception
to this followed a similar pattern to the energetic reserves, where
imposing a cost when the subordinate rested and the dominant
foraged tended to lead to an increase in the length of time that the
subordinate remained heaviest. Again, this is likely to be due to the
subordinate increasing the amount of time it forages in response to
this cost, therefore leading to an increase in its reserves. Increasing
the length of time the subordinate individual remained heaviest
should logically lead to a decrease in the length of time that the
dominant individual remained heaviest, and vice versa. This trend
was seen, but was only significant for the situations where the
subordinate’s costs were paid for conducting the opposite
behaviour to the dominant individual.
Discussion
This model demonstrates that if a subordinate pays energetic
costs when it interacts with a dominant individual, this has
distinct effects upon the behaviour that it shows, and subse-
quently it affects the behaviour of the interacting dominant
individual. Considered independently, both individuals tended to
increase the amount of foraging behaviour they conducted when
there were interaction costs. Considered together, the behaviour
of the pair was driven by the subordinate individual. Costs
imposed when the subordinate forages tend to increase paired
foraging behaviour.
In the model presented here, the subordinate individual tended
to be the lighter individual for longer periods of time when
interaction costs were imposed. This lends support to the
suggestion that the lighter individual acts as the decision-making
‘pace-maker’ of the group [26,27], giving leadership-like
behaviours that are based upon state [24], rather than specific
pre-existing properties of individuals such as their dominance
level [41] or tendency towards leadership [42]. As Rands et al.
[27] discuss, consistent leadership behaviour can be a property of
individuals with a higher metabolic requirement (such as in
lactating female zebras [43]). Therefore, although a dominance
relationship exists in the pairs modelled, the behaviour of the pair
is determined by an individual whose identity emerges from the
interaction between the pair, rather than being strictly set by
which individual is dominant to which. This ‘leadership’ status
should also be transient within the pair, with both the dominant
and the subordinate individual taking it in turns to be lightest and
thus determine the actions of the pair. Within the model,
imposing most sorts of interaction cost leads to a reduction in the
reserves of the subordinate individual, leading in turn to it
remaining heaviest for less consecutive periods of time. This
means that imposing a cost of interaction should lead to the
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subordinate individual becoming the decision-maker more often.
Of course, it should be noted that although there are examples
where subordinates tend to be the ones gaining the most energy
reserves (e.g. [10,44,45]), there are also many empirical examples
where dominant individuals tend to be both the decision-makers
and the ones gaining the most food (e.g. [46–49]).
Therefore, imposing direct energetic costs of dominance should
lead to effects upon the paired behaviour of foragers, lending
support to the rules proposed for larger groups by Rands et al. [6].
Many of the costs of dominance are not directly energetic [9,50–
55]. Although these rules are a relatively simple representation of a
possible cost, the idea of behaviourally-mediated interaction costs
has biological merit. Differences may exist in energetic expendi-
ture between individuals of different social ranks, as has been
demonstrated in fish [18] and birds [19,20] (but see [56]). Mass
gain may differ between individuals of different ranks, even if they
appear to show equal feeding rates [57,58]. These differences in
mass gain by individuals of differing social status may be due to
differences in digestive ability [59,60], or simply a behavioural
difference in the amount of time spent foraging [52,61] – both of
which could be represented by the cost modelled here. Individuals
could also be behaviourally mediating the costs that they pay in
interactions [54], such as subordinates taking a lower share of
resources when social dominance exists as a means of mediating
the behavioural interaction. Lindstro¨m et al. [54] discuss whether a
larger body mass could mean that individuals are better at
mediating these costs. The model presented here only considers a
difference in costs spent during activities, but could be extended to
consider individuals with very different metabolic requirements, in
a similar manner to the model presented by Rands et al. [27].
However, it is likely that a larger scale dominance model including
differences between individuals would yield complex relationships
that would not be simple to describe from a qualitative perspective,
and should maybe be reserved for systems where some amount of
parameterisation is possible.
Furthermore, the current model makes a simplifying assumption
by assuming that the subordinate paid additional costs (and
indeed, being subordinate is solely defined by paying these costs
within the model). We could conceivably see a situation where the
dominant individual also pays additional costs for being dominant.
If these costs are less than those paid by the subordinate, these
could simply be subsumed into the general metabolic costs paid by
individuals, giving us a similar model structure to that described.
However, if the dominant and the subordinate individual paid
different levels of cost for different behaviours such that both paid
more than the other for at least one of the four behavioural pairs,
then this would be a situation not covered within the current
model. For example, we could imagine a situation where the
dominant paid the higher metabolic cost when foraging at the
same time as the subordinate (such as through having to be aware
of the subordinate’s foraging actions, and through expending
energy in forcing the subordinate away from resources), whilst the
subordinate could show a higher metabolic cost than the dominant
when it was foraging on its own (such as through raising vigilance
levels to spot both predators and in anticipation of the currently
absent dominant individual). In this hypothetical example, the
current model is not sufficient, and an extended version would
need to be considered where costs to the dominant individual are
also modelled. I would suggest that this exercise might be useful if
exact predictions are needed for a well-defined system (such as
tying the model in with an empirical system), but investigating a
more general model would be unlikely to yield more tangible
results than described in the simpler model I present here.
As well as behavioural interactions leading to subordinates
gaining less energy during an interaction, physiological processes
may also mean that they spend more energy, and could be
mediated hormonally, such as through stress responses by
individuals. Studies on many species have demonstrated that
social stress and dominance interactions have effects upon body
mass and composition [9,62–67]. Hierarchy rank and measures of
stress typically depend on the social conditions experienced by
animals, and whether there have been recent changes in how the
social structure is organised [68]. Stress, as measured by levels of
hormones such as glucocorticoids, shows no obvious relationship
with dominance rank [69], although there are some correlations
with species social system [70]. Stress has subtle short- and long-
term effects upon an individual’s physiology, and care would be
needed to catch these effects within a dynamic game, although it
has been demonstrated that stress can be successfully captured
using a state-dependent approach [71]. Again, careful parameter-
isation is necessary, but could be very useful for extending the rules
suggested here to larger models considering complex social
interactions (such as [6,23,72–74]), enhancing predictions about
social behaviour and interactions.
Supporting Information
Table S1 F values and significance terms for results
presented in Table 2. In each cell, the first number is the
F1,11566 value obtained from a fully-crossed ANOVA model that
the fifteen terms given. The second number (in parentheses) is the
critical F(p,0.05) value estimated from resampling, above which a
significance level of p,0.05 is assumed.
(DOCX)
Table S2 F values and significance terms for results
presented in Table 3. Data are presented in an identical format
to Supporting Table S1.
(DOCX)
Acknowledgments
Rufus Johnstone, Guy Cowlishaw, Richard Pettifor, Marcus Rowcliffe,
Ce´dric Sueur (the handling editor) and three anonymous reviewers are
gratefully thanked for helpful discussion and comments on drafts of this
work.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: SAR. Performed the experi-
ments: SAR. Analyzed the data: SAR. Wrote the paper: SAR.
References
1. Krause J, Ruxton GD (2002) Living in groups. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
210 p.
2. Wilson EO (1975) Sociobiology: the new synthesis. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press. 366 p.
3. Hand JL (1986) Resolution of social conflicts: dominance, egalitarianism, spheres
of dominance, and game theory. Q Rev Biol 61: 201–220.
4. Drews C (1993) The concept and definition of dominance in animal behaviour.
Behaviour 125: 283–313. doi: 10.1163/156853993X00290.
5. Hemelrijk CK (2002) Understanding social behaviour with the help of complexity
science. Ethology 108: 655–671. doi: 10.1046/j.1439-0310.2002.00812.x.
6. Rands SA, Pettifor RA, Rowcliffe JM, Cowlishaw G (2006) Social foraging and
dominance relationships: the effects of socially mediated interference. Behav
Ecol Sociobiol 60: 572–581. doi: 10.1007/s00265-006-0202-4.
7. Barta Z, Giraldeau L-A (1998) The effect of dominance hierarchy on the use of
alternative foraging tactics: a phenotype-limited producing-scrounging game.
Behav Ecol Sociobiol 42: 217–223. doi: 10.1007/s002650050433.
Social Foraging and Dominance Relationships
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 8 October 2011 | Volume 7 | Issue 10 | e1002252
8. Clark CW, Ekman J (1995) Dominant and subordinate fattening strategies: a
dynamic game. Oikos 72: 205–212.
9. Ekman JB, Lilliendahl K (1993) Using priority to food access: fattening strategies
in dominance-structured willow tit (Parus montanus) flocks. Behav Ecol 4:
232–238. doi: 10.1093/beheco/4.3.232.
10. Pravosudov VV, Lucas JR (2000) The effect of social dominance on fattening
and food-caching behaviour in Carolina chickadees, Poecile carolinensis. Anim
Behav 60: 483–493. doi: 10.1006/anbe.2000.1506.
11. Stahl J, Tolsma PH, Loonen MJJE (2001) Subordinates explore but dominants
profit: resource competition in high Arctic barnacle goose flocks. Anim Behav
61: 257–264. doi: 10.1006/anbe.2000.1564.
12. Lahti K, Koivula K, Orell M (1997) Dominance, daily activity and winter
survival in willow tits: detrimental cost of long working hours? Behaviour 134:
921–939. doi: 10.1163/156853997X00232.
13. Ekman J (2004) Mass-dependence in the predation risk of unequal competitors;
some models. Oikos 105: 109–116. doi: 10.1111/j.0030-1299.2004.10804.x.
14. Hemelrijk CK (1999) An individual-orientated model of the emergence of
despotic and egalitarian societies. Proc R Soc B 266: 361–369. doi: 10.1098/
rspb.1999.0646.
15. Puga-Gonzalez I, Hildenbrandt H, Hemelrijk CK (2009) Emergent patterns of
social affiliation in primates, a model. PLoS Comput Biol 5: e1000630. doi:
10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000630.
16. Goymann W, Wingfield JC (2004) Allostatic load, social status and stress
hormones: the costs of social status matter. Anim Behav 67: 591–602. doi:
10.1016/j.anbehav.2003.08.007.
17. Sapolsky RM (2005) The influence of social hierarchy on primate health.
Science 308: 648–652. doi: 10.1126/science.1106477.
18. Millidine KJ, Metcalfe NB (2009) Presence of a conspecific causes divergent
changes in resting metabolism, depending on its relative size. Proc R Soc B 276:
3989–3993. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2009.1219.
19. Hogstad O (1987) It is expensive to be dominant. Auk 104: 333–336.
20. Bryant DM, Newton AV (1994) Metabolic costs of dominance in dippers, Cinclus
cinclus. Anim Behav 48: 447–455. doi: 10.1006/anbe.1994.1258.
21. Goss-Custard JD (1980) Competition for food and interference among waders.
Ardea 68: 31–52.
22. Stillman RA, Goss-Custard JD, Clarke RT, Durell SEAV (1996) Shape of the
interference function in a foraging vertebrate. J Anim Ecol 65: 813–824.
23. Rands SA, Pettifor RA, Rowcliffe JM, Cowlishaw G (2004) State-dependent
foraging rules for social animals in selfish herds. Proc R Soc B 271: 2613–2620.
doi: 10.1098/rspb.2004.2906.
24. Rands SA (2010) Group movement ‘initiation’ and state-dependent modelling.
Behav Process 84: 668–670. doi: 10.1016/j.beproc.2010.03.001.
25. Rands SA (2011) Approximating optimal behavioural strategies down to rules-
of-thumb: energy reserve changes in pairs of social foragers. PLoS One 6:
e22104. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0022104.
26. Rands SA, Cowlishaw G, Pettifor RA, Rowcliffe JM, Johnstone RA (2003) The
spontaneous emergence of leaders and followers in a foraging pair. Nature 423:
432–434. doi: 10.1038/nature01630.
27. Rands SA, Cowlishaw G, Pettifor RA, Rowcliffe JM, Johnstone RA (2008) The
emergence of leaders and followers in foraging pairs when the qualities of
individuals differ. BMC Evol Biol 8: 51. doi: 10.1186/1471-2148-8-51.
28. Houston AI, McNamara JM (1999) Models of adaptive behaviour: an approach
based on state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 378 p.
29. Clark CW, Mangel M (2000) Dynamic state variable models in ecology: methods
and applications. New York: Oxford University Press. 289 p.
30. Mangel M, Clark CW (1988) Dynamic modeling in behavioral ecology.
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 320 p.
31. Houston AI, Clark CW, McNamara JM, Mangel M (1988) Dynamic models in
behavioural and evolutionary ecology. Nature 332: 29–34. doi: 10.1038/
332029a0.
32. Houston AI, McNamara JM (1988) A framework for the functional analysis of
behaviour. Behav Brain Sci 11: 117–163.
33. Broom M (2002) A unified model of dominance hierarchy formation and
maintenance. J Theor Biol 219: 63–72. doi: 10.1006/yjtbi.3109.
34. McNamara JM, Webb JN, Collins EJ, Sze´kely T, Houston AI (1997) A general
technique for computing evolutionarily stable strategies based on errors in
decision-making. J Theor Biol 189: 211–225. doi: 10.1006/jtbi.1997.0511.
35. McNamara JM, Houston AI (1986) The common currency for behavioral
decisions. Am Nat 127: 358–378.
36. Houston AI, McNamara JM (1988) Fighting for food: a dynamic version of the
Hawk-Dove game. Evolutionary Ecology 2: 51–64.
37. Leimar O, Enquist M (1984) Effects of asymmetries in owner-intruder conflicts.
J Theor Biol 111: 475–491.
38. Rands SA, Johnstone RA (2006) Statistical measures for defining an individual’s
degree of independence within state-dependent dynamic games. BMC Evol Biol
6: 81. doi: 10.1186/1471-2148-6-81.
39. Anderson MJ (2001) Permutation tests for univariate or multivariate analysis of
variance and regression. Can J Fish Aquat Sci 58: 626–639. doi: 10.1139/cjfas-
58-3-626.
40. R Development Core Team (2010) R: a language and environment for statistical
computing. Vienna: R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
41. King AJ, Cowlishaw G (2009) Leaders, followers, and group decision-making.
Commun Integr Biol 2: 147–150.
42. Johnstone RA, Manica A (2011) Evolution of personality differences in
leadership. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 108: 8373–8378. doi: 10.1073/
pnas.1102191108.
43. Fischhoff IR, Sundaresan SR, Cordingley J, Larkin HM, Sellier M-J, et al.
(2007) Social relationships and reproductive state influence leadership roles in
movements of plains zebra, Equus burchellii. Anim Behav 73: 825–831.
44. Hake M (1996) Fattening strategies in dominance-structured greenfinch
(Carduelis chloris) flocks in winter. Behav Ecol Sociobiol 39: 71–76. doi:
10.1007/s002650050268.
45. Pravosudov VV, Grubb TC, jr, Doherty PF, jr, Bronson CL, Pravosudova EV,
et al. (1999) Social dominance and energy reserves in wintering woodland birds.
Condor 101: 880–884.
46. Erhart EM, Overdorff DJ (1999) Female coordination of group travel in wild
Propithecus and Eulemur. Int J Primatol 20: 927–940. doi: 10.1023/A:
1020830703012.
47. Wiedenmann RN, Rabenold KN (1987) The effects of social dominance
between two subspecies of dark-eyed juncos, Junco hyemalis. Anim Behav 35:
856–864. doi: 10.1016/S0003-3472(87)80121-5.
48. Piper WH, Wiley RH (1990) The relationship between social dominance,
subcutaneous fat, and annual survival in wintering white-throated sparrows
(Zonotrichia albicollis). Behav Ecol Sociobiol 26: 201–208. doi: 10.1007/
BF00172087.
49. Lange H, Leimar O (2004) Social stability and daily body mass gain in great tits.
Behav Ecol 15: 549–554. doi: 10.1093/beheco/arh044.
50. Ang TZ, Manica A (2010) Benefits and costs of dominance in the angelfish
Centropyge bicolor. Ethology 116: 855–865. doi: 10.1111/j.1439-0310.2010.01798.x.
51. Sloman KA, Armstrong JD (2002) Physiological effects of dominance
hierarchies: laboratory artefacts or natural phenomena? J Fish Biol 61: 1–23.
doi: 10.1006/jfbi.2002.2038.
52. DiBattista JD, Levesque HM, Moon TW, Gilmour KM (2006) Growth
depression in socially subordinate rainbow trout Oncorhynchus mykiss: more than
a fasting effect. Physiol Biochem Zool 79: 675–687.
53. Hawley DM, Jennelle CS, Sydenstricker KV, Dhondt AA (2007) Pathogen
resistance and immunocompetence covary with social status in house finches
(Carpodacus mexicanus). Funct Ecol 21: 520–527. doi: 10.1111/j.1365-
2435.2007.01254.x.
54. Lindstro¨m KM, Hasselquist D, Wikelski M (2005) House sparrows (Passer
domesticus) adjust their social status position to their physiological costs. Horm
Behav 48: 311–320. doi: 10.1016/j.yhbeh.2005.04.002.
55. Mooring MS, Patton ML, Lance VA, Hall BM, Schaad EW, et al. (2006)
Glucocorticoids of bison bulls in relation to social status. Horm Behav 49:
369–375. doi: 10.1016/j.yhbeh.2005.08.008.
56. Ve´zina F, Thomas DW (2000) Social status does not affect resting metabolic rate
in wintering dark-eyed junco (Junco hyemalis). Physiol Biochem Zool 73: 231–236.
57. Abbott JC, Dill LM (1989) The relative growth of dominant and subordinate
juvenile steelhead trout (Salmo gairdneri) fed equal rations. Behaviour 108:
104–113. doi: 10.1163/156853989X00079.
58. Cuthill IC, Hunt S, Cleary C, Clark C (1997) Colour bands, dominance, and
body mass regulation in male zebra finches (Taeniopygia guttata). Proc R Soc B
264: 1093–1099. doi: 10.1098/rspb.1997.0151.
59. Olsen RE, Ringø E (1999) Dominance hierarchy formation in Arctic charr
Salvelinus alpinus (L.): nutrient digestibility of subordinate and dominant fish.
Aquacult Res 30: 667–671. doi: 10.1046/j.1365-2109.1999.00374.x.
60. Moles A, Bartolomucci A, Garbugino L, Conti R, Caprioli A, et al. (2006)
Psychosocial stress affects energy balance in mice: modulation by social stress.
Psychoneuroendocrinology 31: 623–633. doi: 10.1016/j.psyneuen.2006.01.004.
61. Gilmour KM, DiBattista JD, Thomas JB (2005) Physiological causes and
consequences of social status in salmonid fish. Integr Comp Biol 45: 263–273.
doi: 10.1093/icb/45.2.263.
62. Witter MS, Swaddle JP (1995) Dominance, competition, and energetic reserves
in the European starling, Sturnus vulgaris. Behav Ecol 6: 343–348. doi: 10.1093/
beheco/6.3.343.
63. Tamashiro KLK, Hegeman MA, Nguyen MMN, Melhorn SJ, Ma LY, et al.
(2007) Dynamic body weight and body composition changes in response to
subordination stress. Physiol Behav 91: 440–448. doi: 10.1016/j.physbeh.
2007.04.004.
64. Hay JM, Evans PR, Ward RM, Hamer KC (2004) Poor nutritional status as a
consequence of high dominance status in the coal tit Parus ater. Ibis 146:
103–107. doi: 10.1111/j.1474-919X.2004.00236.x.
65. Hepp GR (1989) Benefits, costs, and determinants of dominance in American
black ducks. Behaviour 109: 222–234. doi: 10.1163/156853989X00240.
66. Verhulst S, Hogstad O (1996) Social dominance and energy reserves in flocks of
willow tits. J Avian Biol 27: 203–208.
67. Witter MS, Goldsmith AR (1997) Social stimulation and regulation of body mass
in female starlings. Anim Behav 54: 279–287. doi: 10.1006/anbe.1996.0443.
68. Bartosˇ L, Schams D, Bubenik GA, Kotrba R, Toma´nek M (2010) Relationship
between rank and plasma testosterone and cortisol in red deer males (Cervus
elaphus). Physiol Behav 101: 628–634. doi: 10.1016/j.physbeh.2010.09.011.
69. Creel S (2001) Social dominance and stress hormones. Trends Ecol Evol 16:
491–497. doi: 10.1016/S0169-5347(01)02227-3.
70. Abbott DH, Keverne EB, Bercovitch FB, Shively CA, Mendoza SP, et al. (2003)
Are subordinates always stressed? A comparative analysis of rank differences in
cortisol levels among primates. Horm Behav 43: 67–82. doi: 10.1016/S0018-
506X(02)00037-5.
Social Foraging and Dominance Relationships
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 9 October 2011 | Volume 7 | Issue 10 | e1002252
71. McNamara JM, Buchanan KL (2005) Stress, resource allocation, and mortality.
Behav Ecol 16: 1008–1017. doi: 10.1093/beheco/ari087.
72. Sueur C, Deneubourg J-L, Petit O, Couzin ID (2010) Differences in nutrient
requirements imply a non-linear emergence of leaders in animal groups. PLoS
Comput Biol 6: e1000917. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000917.
73. Sellers WI, Hill RA, Logan BS (2007) An agent-based model of group decision
making in baboons. Phil Trans R Soc B 362: 1699–1710. doi: 10.1098/
rstb.2007.2064.
74. Rands SA (2010) Self-improvement for team-players: the effects of individual
effort on aggregated group information. PLoS One 5: e11705. doi: 10.1371/
journal.pone.0011705.
Social Foraging and Dominance Relationships
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 10 October 2011 | Volume 7 | Issue 10 | e1002252
